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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Display and Control Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE 8_Y
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis'u_ing the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 222_, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. I0 October 1986.. The IOA
approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potentia/ critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis waus accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Displays and Controls (D&C) Subsystem hardware.
The function of the D&C hardware is to provide the crew with the
monitor, command, and control capabilities required for
management of all normal and contingency mission and flight
operations. The D&C hardware for which failure modes analysis
was performed consists of the following :
o Acceleration Indicator (G-METER)
o Head Up Display (HUD)
o Display Driver Unit (DDU)
o Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI)
o Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI)
o Attitude Director Indicator (ADI)
o Propellant Quantity Indicator (PQI)
o Surface Position Indicator (SPI)
o Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI)
o Caution and Warning Assembly (CWA)
o Annunciator Control Assembly (ACA)
o Event Timer (ET)
o Mission Timer (MT)
o Interior Lighting
o Exterior Lighting
The IOA analysis process utilized available D&C hardware
drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems
briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and
circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for
possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned
based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the fifteen major subdivisions of the D&C subsystem. A summary
of the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
c f j i
Number : 7 0 42 I 1
3/3
84
TOTAL
134
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number
l/l
7
2/IR
0
2/2
0
3/IR
0 3_2R I TOTAL8
2
Figure 1 - D&C OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office
has undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the
Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL re-evaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Ippzoach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawingsto breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
re-evaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized
in the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 D&C Ground Rules and Assumptions
The D&C ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B.
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The function of the D&C hardware is to provide the crew with the
monitor, command, and control capabilities required for
management of all normal and contingency mission and flight
operations.
Figure 2 is an overview of the D&C hardware for which failure
modes analysis was performed. For the analysis, the hardware was
divided into the following five categories:
I. FLIGHT DISPLAYS AND ANNUNCIATORS - These categories
includes the displays that allows manual control of the
vehicle, provide monitoring of automatic control
performance, and provide display of critical flight
parameters. The components of this category are:
(i) G-METER (6) PQI
(2) AMI (7) SPI
(3) AVVI (8) HSI
(4) ADI (9) FLT CNTL PWR
(5) HUD
Figures 3 - i0 provide a hardware breakdown of each of
the above components.
II. CAUTION AND WARNING - This category consists of those
components that inform the crew of out-of-limit
conditions of the vehicle. This category consist of the
following:
(i) ANNUNCIATOR (CWA)
(2) LIMIT MODULE (CWLM)
(3) ELECTRONIC UNIT (CWE)
Figure ii provides a hardware breakdown of each of the
above components.
III. DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT - This category consists of the
electronic unit that provides the interface between
the GPC and the primary flight displays. The function
of this unit is to I) decode data signals from the GPC
and convert these signals to display driver commands,
2) provide ac and dc operating power to the ADI, and
3) set flag on the dedicated displays. The hardware in
this category is the DDU.
Figure 12 is a hardware breakdown of this component.
IV. TIMING DISPLAYS - This category provide the crew with
time referenced to GMT or GET and consist of the
following components:
(i) MISSION TIMER
(2) EVENT TIMER
Figures 13 - 14 provides a hardware breakdown of these
components.
V• LIGHTING - This category consist of the components that
allows illumination of displays and controls, payload
bay operations, EVA's, RMS operations, and docking
operations. The components of this category are:
(I) INTERIOR LIGHTING
(2) EXTERIOR LIGHTING
Figures 15 - 16 provides a hardware breakdown of these
components.
A brief description of the flight displays and annunciators,
caution and warning, display driver unit, timing displays, and
lighting is provided below.
i. One self contained G-METER located on panel F7. It senses
linear acceleration along the Z-body axis of the vehicle.
• Two AMI's one at the CDRs station and one at the PLTs
station. These provide angle of attack, mach/velocity,
equivalent airspeed, and acceleration information to the
crew.
• Two AVVIs, located on panels F6 and F8. They provide
altitude acceleration, altitude rate, barometric altitude,
and radar altitude information to the crew.
. Three ADI located on panel F6, FS, and A6. These provide
simultaneous display of attitude, attitude angular rate,
and attitude error information to the crew.
, Two HUDs located at the CDR and PLT stations• These provide
the crew with information required for landing•
. TWo Propellant Quantity Indicators located on panel F6 and
F8 to provide the crew with the amount of propellant
remaining•
• TWo SPIs located at CDR and PLT stations• The Surface
Position Indicators allows the crew to view the status of
the aerosurfaces of the vehicle•
• Caution and Warning - The function of this system is to
inform the crew of out-of-limit conditions of predetermined
parameters of the vehicle•
• Annunciator Control Assembly - This system provides visual
indication of Orbiter status (emergency/warning - RED,
caution - YELLOW, and advisory - WHITE).
i0. Display Driver Unit - The function of this unit is to
provide the interface between the GPC and the primary flight
displays.
7
Ii. Timing displays provide the crew with time referenced to
Greenwitch Mean Time, liftoff, or to a particular event.
12. Lighting - The function of this system is to provide
illumination of the controllers, numeric displays, interior,
and exterior of the vehicle.
3.2 Xnter£aces and Locations
The D&C hardware is located through the Orbiter. The precise
location for each component switch circuit is provided on the
analysis worksheets in Appendix C.
The D&C hardware is interfaced with the software via the flight
critical MDMs. Switch and power status is monitored via the
flight critical MDMs and operational instrumentation.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the breakdown of the D&C into its hardware
components, and Figures 3 - 16 are\the detailed systems
representations.
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Figure 3 - D&C ACCELERATION INDICATOR (G-METER)
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Figure 4 - D&C HEADS UP DISPLAY (HUD)
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Figure 5 - D&C ALPHA/MACH INDICATOR (AMI)
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Figure 6 - D&C HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATOR (HSI)
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Figure 7 - D&C ATTITUDE DIRECTOR INDICATOR (ADI)
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Figure 8 - D&C PROPELLANT QUANITY INDICATOR (PQI)
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Figure 9 - D&C SURFACE POSITION INDICATOR (SPI)
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Figure 10 - DaC ALT/VERTICAL VELOCITY INDICATOR (AVVI)
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Figure ii - D&C CAUTION AND WARNING ASSEMBLY (CWA)
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Figure 15 - D&C INTERIOR LIGHTING
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Figure 16 - D&C EXTERIOR LIGHTING
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
The D&C analysis was divided into the following five categories:
I. FLIGHT DISPLAYS AND ANNUNCIATORS
II. CAUTION AND WARNING
III. DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
IV. TIMING DISPLAYS
V. LIGHTING
Table I summarizes the total number of identified failure modes
and their criticalities. Table II summarizes the total number of
PCIs.
4 +
Table I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality: I/i 2/IR 2/2 3/IR ] 3/2R I 3/3 TOTAL
Number : 7 - - 42 ] 1 ] 84 134
Table II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
CriticalitY:Number I 1/17 2/IR I 2/2 ]3/IR_ _ _
3/2R
1 3/3_ I TOTAL8
The five categories are summarized below, with the detailed
analysis results for each of the identified failure modes
presented in Appendix C.
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4.1 ANALYSIS RESULTS - D&C FLIGHT DISPLAYS AND ANNUNCIATORS
Eight components were included in this category. Table III lists
the components and summarizes the failure mode criticalities for
each component. Table IV summarizes the number of PCIs for this
category.
4 +
TABLE III D&C FLIGHT DISPLAYS AND ANNUNCIATOR
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
1. G-METER
2. AMI
3. HSI
4. AWI
5. ADI
6. HUD
8. PQI
9. FLT CNL PWR
9. SPI
TOTAL
1/l
7
o
7
2/IR 3/IR
9
9
9
9
1
37
3/2R
m
3/3
2
1
5
1
3
3
6
1
3
25
TOTAL
2
i0
14
i0
12
i0
6
2
3
69
TABLE IV D&C FLIGHT DISPLAY AND ANNUNCIATOR
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
Number
1/1
?
2/IR 2/2
3/IRI_ 3/2R
TOTAL
7
25
4.2 ANALYSIS RESULTS - D&C CAUTION AND WARNING
Three groups make up this category. Table V lists the individual
groups and summarizes the failure mode criticalities for each.
Table VI summarizes the number of PCIs for this category.
4 +
TABLE V D&C CAUTION AND WARNING
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
I. CWA
2. CWLM
3. CWE
2/IR
m
3/3
36
2
2
3/1R 3/2R
2
2TOTAL - - - 40
TOTAL
38
2
2
42
TABLE VI D&C CAUTION AND WARNING
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
CriticalitY:Number: I I/i_ I 2/IR_ 2/2I_ 3/IR
3/2R TOTAL
26
4.3 ANALYSIS RESULTS - D&C DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
One group make up this category. Table VII lists the individual
group and summarizes the failure mode criticalities. Table VIII
summarizes the number of PCIs for this category.
TABLE VII D&C DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
i. DDU
i/i 2/IR
m
3/IR
3
3/2R 3/3
1
TOTAL
4
TOTAL - 3 - 1 4
TABLE VIII D&C DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
CriticalitY:Number: I I/I_ 211R12J2E3JIRi3J2RiT°TAL
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4.4 ANALYSIS RESULTS - D&C TIMING
Two groups make up this category. Table IX lists the individual
groups and summarizes the failure mode criticality for each
group. Table X summarizes the number of PCIs for this category.
TABLE IX D&C TIMING
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticality
Criticality
i. EVENT
2. MISSION
TOTAL
i/i 2/IR 212 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
8
6
14
TOTAL
8
6
14
TABLE X D&C TIMING
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
CriticalitY:Number: I I/I_
2/IR
2/2_ 1 3/IR
3/2R TOTAL
28
4.5 ANALYSIS RESULTS - LIGHTING
Two groups make up this category. Table XI lists the individual
groups and summarizes the failure modes criticalities for each
group. Table XII summarizes the number of PCIs for this category.
TABLE XI D&C LIGHTING
Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
.I. INTERIOR
2. EXTERIOR
i
i
2/IR 2/2
i
3/IR 3/2R
1
3/3
4
1u i i
TOTAL I - I - I- I - I i I 5 I 6
TOTAL
4
2
TABLE XII D&C LIGHTING
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
Number
1/l
i
2/IR
.J.13...j3J. i_ .
29
4.6 LIST OF MDACANALYSIS WORKSHEETIDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
lo
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
i0.
ii.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
ITE_ MDAC ID'S
HUD
DDU
G-METER
AMI
HSI
AVVI
SPI
EVENT TIMER
ADI
MISSION TIMER
CAUTION AND WARNING
ACA
PROP QUANT INDICATOR (PQI)
INT & EXT LIGHTING
INST PWR CKT
MEAS ISO RESISTOR
PWR CHT - FUSES
CROSS POINTER INDICATOR
i01 - 115
201 - 205
301 - 305
401 - 415
501 - 515
601 - 612
701 - 705
ii01 - iii0
1201 - 1215
1301 - 1308
1401 - 1440
1601 - 1605
1701 - 1706
1801 - 1812
1901 - 1902, 2401,2
2001 - 2002
2201 - 2203
2301 - 2301
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AA
ACA -
ACCEL -
A/D
ADI -
ADTA -
AID -
A/L -
ALC
ALPHA -
ALT -
ALTM -
AMI
AOA -
APC -
ASA -
ASC -
ATO -
ATVC -
AVVI -
BARO -
BF
BFS -
BITE -
BP
BRG -
BRT -
CB
CDR -
CEU -
CIL -
CKT
CNL -
CNTLR -
COAS -
CRIT -
CRT -
CSS -
CTR -
CWA
CWE
CWLM -
C&W -
DAP -
DDU -
DEU -
DEVIAT-
DISC -
DPS -
DU
Accelerometer Assembly
Annunciator Control Assembly
Acceleration
Analog to Digital
Attitude Direction Indicator
Air Data Transducer Assembly
Analog Input Differential
Autoland
Aft Load Controller
Angle of Attack
Altitude
Altimeter
Alpha Mach Indicator
Abort Once Around
Aft Power Controller
Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
Ascent
Abort To Orbit
Ascent Thrust Vector Control
Altitude Vertical Velocity Indicator
Barometric
Body Flap
Backup Flight System
Built-In Test Equipment
Barber Pole
Bearing
Bright
Circuit Breaker
Commander
Caution and Warning Electronic Unit
Critical Items List
Circuit
Control
Controller
Crew Optical Alignment Sight
Criticality
Cathode Ray Tube
Control Stick Steering
Center
Caution and Warning Annunciator
Caution and Warning Electronic
Caution and Warning Limit Module
Caution and Warning System
Digital Auto Pilot
Display Driver Unit
Display Electronics Unit
Deviation
Discrete
Data Processing System
Display Unit
A-I
APPENDIX A
EAS
EIU -
EVA -
FA
FCOS -
FCS -
FDIR -
FF
FLT -
FM
FMEA -
FSM -
FSSR -
FSW -
FUNC -
GDI -
GMT
GPC -
GS
GSE -
HEAD -
HSI -
HUD
HUDE -
H/W
IMU -
INTRL -
IOA -
LF
LL
LPS -
LR
LRU
LVLH -
MAN -
MC
MCC -
MCDS -
MDAC -
MDM -
MEC -
MED -
MET -
MIN -
MLS
MM
MSK
M/VEL -
MVS
Equivalent Air Speed
Engine Interface Unit
Extra Vehicular Activity
Flight Aft
Flight Control Operating System
Flight Control System
Fault Detection, Identification, Reconfiguration
Flight Forward
Flight
Failure Mode
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Fault Summary Message
Functional Subsystem Software Requirements
Flight Software
Function
Glideslope Deviation Indicator
Greenwich Mean Time
General Purpose Computer
Glideslope
Ground Support Equipment
Heading
Horizontal Situation Indicator
Head Up Display
Head Up Display Electronics
Hardware
Inertial Measurement Unit
Inertial
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Launch Forward
Launch Left
Launch Processing System
Launch Right
Line Replaceable Unit
Local Vertical Local Horizontal
Manual
Memory Configuration
Mission Control Center
Multifunction CRT Display System
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Main Engine Controller
Medium
Mission Elapsed Time
Minimum
Microwave Landing System
Major Mode
Manual Select Keyboard
Mach/Velocity
Mid Value Select
A-2
APPENDIX A
NA
NASA -
NAV -
NORM -
NSTS -
OA
OF
OMRSD -
OMS
OPS -
p
PBI -
PCI -
PCM -
PDU -
PLT -
POS -
PWR
R
REF -
RCS -
RGA -
RHC -
RI
RJD
RM
RNG
ROT -
RPC -
RPTA -
RS
RTLS -
SBTC -
SEC -
SF
SM
SOP -
SPI -
SRB -
SSME -
ST
STS -
SW
s/w -
TACAN -
TAL -
TAME -
TD
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Navigation
Normal
National Space Transportation System
Operational Aft
Operational Forward
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Operational Sequence
Pitch
Pushbutton Indicator
Potential Critical Item
Pulse Code Modulation
Pilot Display Unit
Pilot
Position
Power
Roll
Reference
Reaction Control System
Rate Gyro Assembly
Rotational Hand Controller
Rockwell International
Reaction Jet Driver
Redundancy Management
Range
Rotation
Remote Power Controller
Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
Redundant Set
Return To Landing Site
Speed Brake Thrust Controller
Secondary
Selection Filter
Systems Management
Subsystem Operating Program
Surface Position Indicator
Solid Rocket Booster
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Star Tracker
Space Transportation System
Switch
Software
Tactical Air Navigation
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Terminal Area Energy Management
Touch Down
A-3
APPENDIX A
THC
TRANS -
TVC -
TW
VAR
VDC -
VERN -
y
Translational Hand Controller
Translation
Thrust Vector Control
Thumbwheel
Variable
Volts Direct Current
Vernier
Yaw
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AT___QO- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW pROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
pRiMARY MISSION 0BJ_CTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
B-3
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
lo
•
•
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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.
•
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
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D&C - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The failure analyses will be conducted to the black box
level for components whose output serves only one function
unless a lower level is required.
RATIONALE: The definition credible failure modes are
oriented toward the black box functional
output.
For black boxes whose output serves more than one function,
the analysis will go to a level that effects each of the
different functions•
RATIONALE: The defined credible failure modes are
oriented toward the black box functional
output.
Credible failure modes for most black boxes are defined to
be
(i) No output
(2) Erroneous output (Output that redundancy management
will detect as a failure•)
(3) Premature output (Output occurs without command. This
may not be credible for all black boxes.)
RATIONALE: Covers worst case effects on function•
Credible failures for switches are defined to be
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Fails on (Power cannot be shut off by switch•)
Fails off (Power cannot be turned on.)
Short to ground
Internal short (Short across switch contacts.)
RATIONALE: Covers worst case effects on function•
Power circuits analysis does not include the resistors that
reside between the power circuit and a MDM.
RATIONALE: These resistors provide signal conditioning
for the MDM and are not a part of the power
circuit.
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DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of the D&C subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the FMEA's written by
Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets identifies the item
being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well as the function. For
each failure mode, the possible causes are outlined, and the
assessed hardware and functional criticality for each mission
phase is listed, as described in the JSC/NSTS 22206, Instructions
For Preparation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and
Critical Items List (CIL). Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
IR = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 = Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
C-I
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: i01
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HUDE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) HUD
3 ) HUDE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3B
PART NUMBER: MC409-0096-0012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THE EVENT OF A NIGHT LANDING. IF THE COMMANDER'S HUD IS LOST
WHILE ORBITER IS APPROACHING FINAL FLARE THE COMMANDER WILL NOT
HAVE ALTITUDE DATA READILY AVAILABLE AND HENCE A SAFE LANDING
WILL DEPEND ON THE SKILL OF THE COMMANDER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - 20 HUD - DWG NO. 9.20A, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73AZ, (4) D&C FSSR STS83-0020C
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDACID: 102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HUDE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) D&C
2) HUD
3 ) HUDE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3B
MC409-0096-0012
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THE EVENT OF A NIGHT LANDING. IF THE COMMANDER'S HUD IS LOST
WHILE ORBITER IS APPROACHING FINAL FLARE THE COMMANDER WILL NOT
HAVE ALTITUDE DATA READILY AVAILABLE AND HENCE A SAFE LANDING
WILL DEPEND ON THE SKILL OF THE COMMANDER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - 20 HUD - DWG NO. 9.20A, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73AZ, (4) D&C FSSR STS83-0020C
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PDU
ERRONEOUSOUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYSLEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HUD
3) PDU
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, PNL A8
PART NUMBER: MC409-0096-0031
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THE EVENT OF A NIGHT LANDING. IF THE COMMANDER'S HUD IS LOST
WHILE ORBITER IS APPROACHING FINAL FLARE THE COMMANDER WILL NOT
HAVE ALTITUDE DATA READILY AVAILABLE AND HENCE A SAFE LANDING
WILL DEPEND ON THE SKILL OF THE COMMANDER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - 20 HUD - DWG NO. 9.20A, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73AZ, (4) D&C FSSR STS83-0020C
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PDU
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HUD
3) PDU
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/i ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
1/i
1/1
1/1
1/1
B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F6, PNL A8
MC409-0096-0031
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THE EVENT OF A NIGHT LANDING. IF THE COMMANDER'S HUD IS LOST
WHILE ORBITER IS APPROACHING FINAL FLARE THE COMMANDER WILL NOT
HAVE ALTITUDE DATA READILY AVAILABLE AND HENCE A SAFE LANDING
WILL DEPEND ON THE SKILL OF THE COMMANDER.
REFERENCES: (I) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - 20 HUD - DWG NO. 9.20A, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73AZ, (4) D&C FSSR STS83-0020C
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 105 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, DATA BUS SELECT 1,2,3,4
FAILS TO TRANSFER IN ANY POSITION
LEAD ANALYST : W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HUD
3) SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, PNL F8
PART NUMBER: ME452-0093-5025
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, DATA WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE HUD VIA THE DEFAULT
DATA BUS.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - 20 HUD - DWG NO. 9.20A, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73AZ, (4) D&C FSSR STS83-0020C
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87
D&C/EPD&C
106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITING
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HUD
3) RESISTOR
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/I
1/1
1/1
B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F6, PNL F8
RLR42CI22GM
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THE EVENT OF A NIGHT LANDING. IF THE COMMANDER'S HUD IS LOST
WHILE ORBITER IS APPROACHING FINAL FLARE THE COMMANDER WILL NOT
HAVE ALTITUDE DATA READILY AVAILABLE AND HENCE A SAFE LANDING
WILL DEPEND ON THE SKILL OF THE COMMANDER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - 20 HUD - DWG NO. 9.20A, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73AZ, (4) D&C FSSR STS83-0020C
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87
D&C/EPD&C
107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH - ON/OFF
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HUD
3) SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL F3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THE EVENT OF A NIGHT LANDING. IF THE COMMANDER'S HUD IS LOST
WHILE ORBITER IS APPROACHING FINAL FLARE THE COMMANDER WILL NOT
HAVE ALTITUDE DATA READILY AVAILABLE AND HENCE A SAFE LANDING
WILL DEPEND ON THE SKILL OF THE COMMANDER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - 20 HUD - DWG NO. 9.20A, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73AZ, (4) D&C FSSR STS83-0020C
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-8
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6117187
D&C/EPD&C
108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH - ON/OFF
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HUD
3) SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F3
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - SWITCH IS NORMALLY CLOSED WHEN USE OF HUD IS
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - 20 HUD - DWG NO. 9.20A, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73AZ, (4) D&C FSSR STS83-0020C
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 109
ITEM: RPC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HUD
3) RPC
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: F-PCA-I, F-PCA-2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-II00
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - RPC IS NORMALLY CLOSED WHEN USE OF HUD IS CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - 20 HUD - DWG NO. 9.20A, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73AZ, (4) D&C FSSR STS83-0020C
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87
D&C/EPD&C
ii0
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) HUD
3) RPC
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F-PCA-1, F-PCA-2
MC450-0017-II00
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THE EVENT OF A NIGHT LANDING. IF THE COMMANDER'S HUD IS LOST
PRIOR TO FINAL FLARE, ALTITUDE DATA IS NOT READILY AVAILABLE.
HENCE A SAFE LANDING DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON THE SKILL OF THE
COMMANDER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 201 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DDU
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) DDU
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONIC BAY
PART NUMBER: MC409-0023-0002
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL FLIGHT INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLLER TRANSDUCERS WILL FAIL
IN THE STATION ASSIGNED TO THE AFFECTED DDU. THE OTHER FLIGHT
STATION AND THE AUTO MODE IS AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF
VEHICLE'S STATUS DURING CRITICAL FLIGHT PHASES REQUIRING CREW
RESPONSE IN THE MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/09/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DDU
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) DDU
3)
4)
s)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONIC BAY
MC409-0023-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL FLIGHT INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLLER TRANSDUCERS WILL HAVE
ERRONEOUS INFORMATION IN THE STATION ASSIGNED TO THE AFFECTED
DDU. THE OTHER FLIGHT STATION AND THE AUTO MODE IS AVAILABLE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S STATUS DURING CRITICAL FLIGHT
PHASES REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN THE MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
D&C/EPD&C
203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DDU - DATA BUS SWITCH, & CB
FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) D&C
2 ) DDU
3) DATA BUS SWITCH, & CB
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONIC BAY
PART NUMBER: MC409-0023-0002
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FLIGHT INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLLER TRANSDUCERS
INFORMATION IN THE STATION ASSIGNED TO THE AFFECTED DDU. THE
OTHER FLIGHT STATION IS AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S
STATUS DURING CRITICAL FLIGHT PHASES REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN
THE MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87
D&C/EPD&C
204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DDU - DATA BUS SWITCH, & CB
FAIL CLOSE, SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2 ) DDU
3) DATA BUS SWITCH, & CB
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
H DW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONIC BAY
MC409-0023-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. CAPABILITY TO SWITCH DATA BUS IS LOST.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 6/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
G-METER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) D&C
2 ) G-METER
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL F7
PART NUMBER: MC432-0219-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. OUTPUT OF THE DISPLAY NOT CRITICAL TO MISSION
ACCOPLISHMENT OR CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
G-METER
ERRONEOUSOUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYSLEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) G-METER
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL F7
PART NUMBER: MC432-0219-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. OUTPUT OF THE DISPLAY NOT CRITICAL TO MISSION
ACCOMPLISHMENT OR CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 6/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 401
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMI-ALPHA
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) D&C
2) AMI
3 ) ALPHA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0023-0224-0011/0022
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALPHA ON AFFECTED AMI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER
AMI AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S ALPHA
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDACI D: 402
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMI-ALPHA
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) D&C
2) AMI
3 ) ALPHA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0023-0224-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS ALPHA IN AFFECTED AMI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER
AMI AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S TRUE ALPHA
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDACID: 403
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMI-M/VEL
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) AMI
3) M/VEL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0023-0224-0011/0022
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF M/VEL ON AFFECTED AMI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER
AMI AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S M/VEL
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 404
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMI-M/VEL
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) AMI
3) M/VEL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0023-0224-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS M/VEL ON AFFECTED AMI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER
AMI AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBLIITY OF VEHICLE'S TRUE M/VEL
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 405
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMI-ACCEL
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) AMI
3) ACCEL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0023-0224-0011/0022
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ACCEL ON AFFECTED AMI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER
AMI AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S ACCEL
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 406 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: AMI-ACCEL
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) AMI
3 ) ACCEL
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0023-0224-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS ACCEL ON AFFECTED AMI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER
AMI AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S TRUE ACCEL
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 6/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 407
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMI-EAS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) AMI
3) EAS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0023-0224-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF EAS ON AFFECTED AMI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER AMI
AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S EAS REQUIRING CREW
RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 408
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMI-EAS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) D_I
3) EAS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0023-0224-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS EAS ON AFFECTED AMI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER
AMI AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S TRUE EAS
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/lO/87
D&C/EPD&C
409
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMI-ADTA SW, RESISTOR, & FUSES
FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) AMI
3) ADTA SW, RESISTOR, AND FUSES
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC452-0102-7106
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SOURCE OF INPUT ON AFFECTED AMI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE
ON OTHER AMI AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S STATE
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87
D&C/EPD&C
410
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMI-ADTA SW, RESISTOR, & FUSES
FAIL CLOSED, SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) AMI
3) ADTA SW, RESISTOR, AND FUSES
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC452-0102-7106
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON AFFECTED AMI WILL NOT CHANGE.
OTHER AMI OR CRT AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-BEARING
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HSI
3) BEARING
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0218-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BEARING OF VEHICLE IS LOST ON AFFECTED HSI. INFORMATION IS
AVAILABLE ON OTHER HSI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF THE VEHICLE'S
POSITION REQUIRING RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDACID: 502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-BEARING
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) HSI
3) BEARING
4)
s)
6)
7)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0218-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ACTUAL BEARING OF VEHICLE IS LOST ON AFFECTED HSI. INFORMATION
IS AVAILABLE ON OTHER HSI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF THE
VEHICLE'S POSITION REQUIRING RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: HSI-HEADING
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HSI
3) HEADING
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0218-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEADING OF VEHICLE IS LOST ON AFFECTED HSI. INFORMATION IS
AVAILABLE ON OTHER HSI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF THE VEHICLE'S
POSITION REQUIRING RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-HEADING
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HSI
3) HEADING
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0218-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ACTUAL HEADING OF VEHICLE IS LOST ON AFFECTED HSI. INFORMATION
IS AVAILABLE ON OTHER HSI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF THE
VEHICLE'S POSITION REQUIRING RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-COURSE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) D&C
2) HSI
3) COURSE
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0218-0002
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COURSE OF VEHICLE IS LOST ON AFFECTED HSI. INFORMATION IS
AVAILABLE ON OTHER HSI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF THE VEHICLE'S
POSITION REQUIRING RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-COURSE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HSI
3 ) COURSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0218-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ACTUAL COURSE OF VEHICLE IS LOST ON AFFECTED HSI. INFORMATION IS
AVAILABLE ON OTHER HSI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF THE VEHICLE'S
POSITION REQUIRING RESPONSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: HSI-RNG
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST : W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) D&C
2) HSI
3) RNG
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0218-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. RNG NOT A CRITICAL DISPLAY REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-RNG
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) HSl
3) RNG
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0218-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. RNG NOT A CRITICAL DISPLAY REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-MODE SW & RESISTOR
FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GND
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) HSI
3) MODE SW & RESISTOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432,0218-0002
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INPUT TO AFFECTED HSI WILL BE LOST. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON
OTHER HSI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S POSITION
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-MODE SW & RESISTOR
FAILED CLOSED, SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) HSI
3) MODE SW & RESISTOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0218-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. MODE CAN NOT BE SHANGED. OTHER HSI OR CRT AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 511 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-SOURCE SW & RESISTOR
FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) HSI
3) SOURCE SW & RESISTOR
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0218-0002
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INPUT TO AFFECTED HSI WILL BE LOST. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON
OTHER HSI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S POSITION
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HSI-SOURCE SW & RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED, SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) HSI
3) SOURCE SW & RESISTOR
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0218-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. SOURCE CAN NOT BE CHANGED. OTHER HSI OR CRT AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/03/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: HSI-SOURCE SEL SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
HSI
SOURCE SEL SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0218-0002
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INPUT TO AFFECTED HSI WILL BE LOST. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON
OTHER HSI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S POSITION
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-40
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6103187
D&C/EPD&C
514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HSI-SOURCE SEL SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE
FAIL CLOSED, SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
HSI
SOURCE SEL SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F6, F8
MC432-0218-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. ANTENNA CAN NOT BE CHANGED. OTHER HSI OR CRT AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 601 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AVVI - ALT ACCEL
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) AWI
3) ALT ACCEL
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0225-0011/0022
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALT ACCEL ON AFFECTED AVVI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON
OTHER AVVI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S ALT ACCEL
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-42
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: AVVI - ALT ACCEL
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) AVVI
3) ALT ACCEL
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL_ 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0025-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ACTUAL ALT ACCEL ON AFFECTED AVVI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE
ON OTHER AVVI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S ACTUAL ALT
ACCEL REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 603 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AVVI - ALT RATE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2 ) AVVI
3 ) ALT RATE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0225-0011/0022
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALT RATE ON AFFECTED AVVI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON
OTHER AVVI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S ALT RATE
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-44
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 604 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AWI - ALT RATE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&c
2) AVVI
3) ALT RATE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT : 3/IR ATO : 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F6, F8
MC432-0025-0011/0022
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ACTUAL ALT RATE ON AFFECTED AVVI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE
ON OTHER AVVI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S ACTUAL ALT
RATE REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 6/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 605
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AVVI - ALT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) AVVI
3 ) ALT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0225-0011/0022
t
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALT ON AFFECTED AVVI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER
AVVI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S ALT REQUIRING
CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 606 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: AVVI - ALT
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) AVVI
3) ALT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LAND!NG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0225-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ACTUAL ALT ON AFFECTED AWI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON
OTHER AVVI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S ACTUAL ALT
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 607 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AVVI - RDR ALT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) AVVI
3 ) RDR ALT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION : PNL F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0225-0011/0022
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RDRALT ON AFFECTED AWI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER
AVVI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S RDR ALT
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C
MDAC ID: 608
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: AVVI - RDR ALT
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) AVVI
3 ) RDR ALT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8
PART NUMBER: MC432-0025-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ACTUAL RDR ALT ON AFFECTED AWI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE
ON OTHER AVVI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW /VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S ACTUAL RDR
ALT REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE IN MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6112187
D&C/EPD&C
609
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AVVI - RDR ALT SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE
FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) AVVI
3) RDR ALT SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F6, F8
MC432-0225-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. LOSS OF RDRALT ON AFFECTED AVVI.
ON OTHER AVVI OR CRT.
INFORMATION AVAILABLE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
611218 
D&C/EPD&C
610
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AVVI - RDR ALT SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE
FAIL CLOSED, SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) Dac
2) AWI
3) RDR ALT SW, RESISTOR, & FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: -3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F6, F8
MC432-0225-0011/0022
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SWITCH RDR ALT ON AFFECTED AVVI.
INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER AVVI OR CRT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 701 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SPI
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) sPi
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F7
MC432-0224-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON CRT. ITEM NOT CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY OR MISSION COMPLETENESS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 702 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SPI
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST : W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) SPI
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL F7
PART NUMBER: MC432-0224-0011
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON CRT. ITEM NOT CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY OR MISSION COMPLETENESS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 /17/87
D&C/EPD&C
703
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SPI-PWR CKT
FAILED OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) Dac
2) SPI
3) CIRCUIT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F6
MC451-0018-0300
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON CRT. ITEM NOT CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY OR MISSION COMPLETENESS. CIRCUIT CONSIST OF
POWER THROUGH THE INST PWR SWITCH AND FUSES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: II01 ABORT:
HDW/_mC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: METER, EVENT TIMER
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) EVENT TIMER
3) METER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F7, PNL A4
MC456-0053-002
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: EVENT TIME CAN BE DETERMINED FROM MISSION TIMER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - i0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1102 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, EVENT TIMER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) EVENT TIMER
3 ) METER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL F7, PNL A4
PART NUMBER: MC456-0053-002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE: EVENT TIME CAN BE DETERMINED FROM MISSION TIMER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - I0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-56
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1103 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SELECTED
SWITCH - UP/DOWN/TEST
FAILS CLOSED IN A POSITION OTHER THAN THE ONE
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) EVENT TIMER
3) SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL C2, PNL A6
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7107
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DESIRED TIMER OUTPUT - TIMING INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON
OTHER TIMER OR CAN BE DETERMINED FROM MISSION TIMER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - i0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1104 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) EVENT TIMER
3) CIRCUIT BREAKER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL 014B, PNL 015A
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY CLOSED.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - I0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87
D&C/EPD&C
1105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER-EVENT TIMER
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) EVENT TIMER
3 ) CIRCUIT BREAKER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014B, PNL 015A
MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TIMER OUTPUT. EVENT TIME IS AVAILABLE ON OTHER TIMER OR
CAN BE DETERMINED FROM MISSION TIMER.
REFERENCES: (I) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - I0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1106 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH - START/STOP
FAILS OPEN OR CLOSED IN ANY POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) EVENT TIMER
3) SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL C2, PNL A6
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7105
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS TIMER OUTPUT, EVENT TIME IS AVAILABLE ON OTHER TIMER OR
CAN BE DETERMINED FROM MISSION TIMER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - I0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH - SET/RESET
FAILS OPEN OR CLOSED IN ANY POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) EVENT TIMER
3) SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL C2, PNL A6
ME452-0102-7105
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS TIMER OUTPUT, EVENT TIME IS AVAILABLE ON OTHER TIMER OR
CAN BE DETERMINED FROM MISSION TIMER.
REFERENCES: (I) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - i0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1108 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH - THUMBWHEEL - MIN/SEC
FAILURE MODE: ANY CONTACT FAILED OPEN OR CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) EVENT TIMER
3) SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL C2, PNL A6
PART NUMBER: ME452-0134-I005
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS TIMER OUTPUT, EVENT TIME IS AVAILABLE ON OTHER TIMER OR
CAN BE DETERMINED FROM MISSION TIMER.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - I0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-ATTITUDE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) ADI
3 ) ATTITUDE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL F6, F8, A134
MC432-0233-0001, 0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATTITUDE INFORMATION LOST ON AFFECTED AID. INFORMATION AVAILABLE
ON THE CRT DISPLAY OR OTHER ADI'S. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY TO THE CREW
OF VEHICLE ATTITUDE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1202 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-ATTITUDE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2 ) ADI
3 ) ATTITUDE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL F6, F8, A134
PART NUMBER: MC432-0233-0001, 0002
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS ATTITUDE INFORMATION ON THE AFFECTED ADI. INFORMATION
AVAILABLE ON OTHER ADI'S AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE CREW TO REACT WITH IMPROPER DECISIONS AFFECTING THE SAFETY
OF THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-64
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-RATES
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) ADI
3) RATES
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL F6, F8, A134
PART NUMBER: MC432-0233-0001, 0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATE INFORMATION LOST ON THE AFFECTED ADI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE
ON OTHER ADI'S AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF VISIBILITY TO THE CREW OF VEHICLE
RATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1204 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-RATES
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2 ) ADI
3 ) RATE
4)
5)
6)
"I)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL F6, F8, A134
PART NUMBER: MC432-0233-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RATE INFORMATION ERRONEOUS ON THE AFFECTED ADI. INFORMATION
AVAILABLE ON OTHER AID'S AND THE CRT. IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST,
THE SAFETY OF THE CREW/VEHICLE MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE CREW'S
RESPONSES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 1211_18_ c-66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1205 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-ERRORS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2 ) ADI
3 ) ERRORS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL F6, F8, A134
MC432-0233-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATTITUDE ERROR INFORMATION LOST ON AFFECTED ADI. INFORMATION
AVAILABLE ON OTHER ADI'S AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF VISIBILITY TO THE
CREW OF VEHICLE ATTITUDE ERRORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1206 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-ERRORS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) ADI
3 ) ERRORS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT : 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT : 3/1R ATO : 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL F6, F8, A134
PART NUMBER: MC432-0233-0001
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATTITUDE ERROR INFORMATION ON AFFECTED ADI. INFORMATION
AVAILABLE ON OTHER ADI'S AND CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF VISIBILITY TO
THE CREW OF CORRECT VEHICLE ATTITUDE ERRORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: ADI-ERR SEL SW & RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) ADI
3 ) ERRORS
4 ) SCALE SEL
5) SW & RESISTOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT : 3/IR AOA : 3/IR
DEORBIT : 3/IR ATO : 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F6, F8, A134
MC432-0233-0001, 0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ATTITUDE ERROR INFORMATION ON THE AFFECTED ADI.
INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON OTHER ADIIS OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE LOSS OF
VISIBILITY OF THE VEHICLE WS ATTITUDE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-69
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1208 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-ERR SEL SW & RESISTOR
FAIL CLOSED, SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2 ) ADI
3 ) ERROR
4) SCALE SEL
5) SW & RESISTOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8, A134
PART NUMBER: MC432,0233,0001, 0002
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. SCALE OF ATTITUDE INFORMATION CAN NOT BE CHANGED.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1209 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-RATE SEL SW & RESISTOR
FAIL CLOSED, SHORT CONTACT TO CONTACT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) ADI
3) RATE
4) SCALE SEL
5) SW & RESISTOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL F6, F8, A134
MC432-0233-0001, 0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. SCALE OF RATE INFORMATION CAN NOT BE CHANGED.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-RATE SEL SW & RESISTOR
FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) ADI
3) RATE
4) SCALE SEL
5) SW & RESISTOR
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8, A134
PART NUMBER: MC432-0233-0001, 0002
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RATE INFORMATION ON AFFECTED ADI. INFORMATION AVAILABLE
ON OTHER ADI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S RATES
REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE DURING MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-72
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-MODE SEL SW
FAIL OPEN; SHORT TO GND
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) ADI
3) MODE SEL SW
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8, A134
PART NUMBER: MC432-0233-0001, 0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REFERENCE INFORMATION LOST ON AFFECTED ADI. INFORMATION
AVAILABLE ON OTHER ADI OR CRT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE LOSS OF VISIBILITY OF VEHICLE'S
REFERENCE REQUIRING CREW RESPONSE DURING MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1212 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADI-MODE SEL SW
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) ADI
3) MODE SEL SW
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL F6, F8, A134
PART NUMBER: MC432-0233-0001, 0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. REFERENCE FRAME CANNOT BE CHANGED.
AVAILABLE.
OTHER ADI OR CRT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-74
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1301 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: METER, MISSION TIMER
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) D&C
2 ) MISSION TIMER
3 ) METER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL 03, PNL A4
PART NUMBER: MC456-0054-002
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. MISSION TIME IS AVAILABLE ON OTHER MISSION TIMER OR CRT.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - i0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1302 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, MISSION TIMER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2 ) MISSION TIMER
3 ) METER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL 03, PNL A4
PART NUMBER: MC456-0054-002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. MISSION TIME IS AVAILABLE ON OTHER MISSION TIMER OR CRT.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - I0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-76
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1303 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SELECTED
SWITCH - GMT/MET/TEST
FAILS CLOSED IN A POSITION OTHER THAN THE ONE
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) D&C
2) MISSION TIMER
3 ) SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL 03, PNL A4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DESIRED TIMER OUTPUT - TIMING INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON
OTHER TIMER OR CRT.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - i0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1304 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) D&C
2) MISSION TIMER
3) CIRCUIT BREAKER
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL 014B, PNL 015A
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, CIRCUIT IS NORMALLY CLOSED.
REFERENCES: (I) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - I0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87
D&C/EPD&C
1305
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER-MISSION TIMER
FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) MISSION TIMER
3 ) CIRCUIT BREAKER
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014B, PNL 015A
MC545-0026-2030
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DESIRED TIMER OUTPUT - TIMING INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON
OTHER TIMER OR CRT.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - i0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1306 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH - GMT/MET/TEST
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) MISSION TIMER
3) SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING :
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 03, PNL A4
ME452-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DESIRED TIMER OUTPUT - TIMING INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON
OTHER TIMER OR CRT.
REFERENCES: (i) SYSTEM BRIEF - GNC/JSC 18863, (2) SSSH - JSC
11174 - i0 TIM - DWG NO. 8.10, (3) INTEGRATED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC -
VS70-973099 - 73KA, 73KB
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1401 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION & WARNING ELECTRONICS UNIT (CEU)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) CEU
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V73A4 (BAY 3A)
MC409-0012-0031
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION FROM THE ANNUNCIATOR ARRAY, C/W STATUS
MATRIX, AND MASTER ALARM LIGHTS AND TONE. OUT-OF-LIMITS
CONDITONS ARE STILL ANNUNCIATED BY SOFTWARE FAULT MESSAGES.
THE ABILITY TO SET OR READ A PARAMETER'S LIMITS AND TO ENABLE OR
INHIBIT ANNUNCIATION FOR A PARAMETER USING C/W SWITCHES IS ALSO
LOST. THESE FUNCTIONS MAY BE PERFORMED USING SM SPEC 60 OR GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS; ALL C/W MONITORED
QUANTITIES ARE DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1402 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION & WARNING ELECTRONICS UNIT (CEU)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) CEU
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: 83V73A4 (BAY 3A)
PART NUMBER: MC409-0012-0031
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ABILITY TO CORRECTLY SET OR READ PARAMETER LIMIT VALUES, OR
TO ENABLE OR INHIBIT ANNUNCIATION FOR A PARAMETER USING C/W
SWITCHES MAY BE LOST.
FAILURE TO ANNUNCIATE AN OUT-OF LIMITS CONDITION OR FALSE
ANNUNCIATION OF AN OUT-OF-LIMITS CONDITION MAY ALSO OCCUR.
SOFTWARE PROVIDES REDUNDANCY FOR THESE FUNCTIONS.
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS; ALL C/W MONITORED
QUANTITIES ARE DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS, AND
PARAMETER LIMITS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE FDF REFERENCE DATA BOOK.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-82
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1403 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W ANNUNCIATOR ASSEMBLY
LOSS OF OUTPUT / PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W ANNUNCIATOR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A7A2 (PANEL F7)
MC434-0069-0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE MEANS OF ANNUNCIATING AN OUT-OF-LIMITS CONDITION IS LOST.
THE MASTER ALARM LIGHTS & TONE AND SOFTWARE MESSAGES PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL FAULT ANNUNCIATION.
IF ALL FAILURE ANNUNCIATION IS LOST, AN UNANNUNCIATED OUT-OF-
LIMITS CONDITION MAY EXIST.
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS; ALL C/W MONITORED
QUANTITIES ARE ALSO DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS, AND
PARAMETER LIMITS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE FDF REFERENCE DATA BOOK.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1404 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W STATUS DISPLAY
LOSS OF OUTPUT / PARTIAL OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) C/W STATUS DISPLAY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3AIXDSI (PANEL RI3AI)
PART NUMBER: MC409-0012-0002
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE MEANS OF SETTING/READING LIMIT VALUES AND ENABLING/INHIBITING
ANNUNCIATION OF A PARAMETER IS LOST. THESE FUNCTIONS MAY BE
PERFORMED USING SPEC 60 OR GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
LOSS OF THESE FUNCTIONS HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT ON THE CREW,
VEHICLE, OR MISSION. PARAMETER LIMIT VALUES ARE LISTED IN THE
FDF REFERENCE DATA BOOK, AND THE CREW MAY MONITOR GAGES/CRT
DISPLAYS TO SEE THAT PARAMETERS ARE WITHIN LIMITS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. I, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-84
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1405 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W STATUS DISPLAY
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) C/W STATUS DISPLAY
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A13AIXDS1 (PANEL RI3A1)
MC409-0012-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUTPUT OF INCORRECT PARAMETER LIMIT VALUES OR INCORRECT DISPLAY
OF OUT-OF-LIMITS OR INHIBITED PARAMETERS MAY BE CONFUSING TO THE
CREW. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY THE C/W ANNUNCIATOR ARRAY AND
THE SM TABLE MAINTENANCE DISPLAY.
IF ALL DATA ON PARAMETER LIMIT VALUES AND/OR STATUS IS INCORRECT,
THERE IS NO SAFETY IMPACT TO THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION. THE
CREW MAY MONITOR PARAMETERS VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS TO
ASSURE THAT THEY ARE WITHIN LIMITS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-85
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1406 ABORT:
ITEM: C/W ANNUNCIATOR MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/WANNUNCIATORMEMORY SWITCH
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 35V73A3A5 (PANEL C3A5) - $6
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THERE IS AN OPEN CIRCUIT IN THE ANNUNCIATOR MEMORY SWITCH, ONE
MEANS TO READ WHICH PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN OUT-OF-LIMITS, OR TO
CLEAR THE RECALL MEMORY IS LOST. REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED BY THE
STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY SWITCH.
LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT ON THE CREW, VEHICLE,
OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. I, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1407 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W ANNUNCIATOR MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)
INADVERTENT OPERATION - STUCK IN "READ"
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W ANNUNCIATOR MEMORY SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 35V73A3A5 (PANEL C3A5) - $6
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS FOR PARAMETERS WHICH HAVE BEEN OUT-OF-LIMITS
SINCE THE LAST MEMORY CLEAR WILL REMAIN ILLUMINATED. MEMORY MAY
BE CLEARED USING THE STATUS MATRIX MEMORY SWITCH.
LOSS OF ABILITY TO DISABLE THE READ MODE IS LOSS OF ONE MEANS OF
LOCATING A FAILURE. HOWEVER, ALL C/W MONITORED PARAMETERS ARE
DISPLAYED ON GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS, AND MAY BE MONITORED BY
THE CREW.
THIS FAILURE HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE
OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOLo i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1408 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W ANNUNCIATOR MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)
INADVERTENT OPERATION - STUCK IN "CLEAR"
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/WANNUNCIATORMEMORY SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 35V73A3A5 (PANEL C3A5) - $6
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE ANNUNCIATOR MEMORY SWITCH IS STUCK IN THE "CLEAR"
POSITION, OUT-OF-LIMITS OCCURENCES WILL NOT BE STORED IN RECALL
MEMORY. ANNUNCIATION OF AN OUT-OF-LIMITS CONDITION WILL OCCUR AS
USUAL.
THIS IS A NON-ESSENTIAL FUNCTION, AND ITS LOSS HAS NO SAFETY
IMPACT ON THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-88
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1409 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W ANNUNCIATOR LAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/WANNUNCIATOR LAMP TEST SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
33V73A6 (PANEL 06) - S14, 33V73A8 (PANEL 08) - S18
ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO TEST ANNUNCIATOR LAMPS HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT ON
THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. I, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-89
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
D&C FLIGHT: 3/3
1410 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W ANNUNCIATOR LAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)
INADVERTENT OPERATION - STUCK IN "LEFT" OR "RIGHT"
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/WANNUNCIATOR LAMP TEST SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 33V73A6 (PANEL 06) - S14, 33V73A8 (PANEL 08) - S18
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HALF OF THE ANNUNCIATOR LAMPS WILL REMAIN ON; ONE MEANS OF
FLAGGING AN OUT-OF-LIMITS CONDITION IS LOST.
ANNUNCIATION IS STILL PROVIDED BY THE MASTER ALARM TONE & LIGHTS
AND BY SOFTWARE MESSAGES. THE C/W STATUS MATRIX CAN BE CHECKED
TO FIND PARAMETERS OUT OF LIMITS. LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION MAY
RESULT IN UNANNUNCIATED FAILURE CONDITIONS.
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS; ALL C/W MONITORED
QUANTITIES ARE DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS, AND MAY
BE MONITORED BY THE CREW.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-90
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1411 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY (VAR/BRT)
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 33V73A6 (PANEL 06) - $51
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN CIRCUIT IN THE ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY SWITCH HAS NO SAFETY
IMPACT ON THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. I, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1412 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY (VAR/BRT)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 33V73A6 (PANEL 06) - $51
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY SWITCH IS STUCK IN THE "VARIABLE" OR
"BRIGHT" POSITION, THERE IS NO IMPACT TO THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-92
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1413 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY KNOB
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY KNOB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73A6 (PANEL 06)
ME452-0093-? OR ME444-0059-? OR ME444-0060-II01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN CIRCUIT FAILURE IN THE ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY KNOB HAS NO
SAFETY IMPACT ON THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-93
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1414 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY KNOB
FAILS MID-TRAVEL - UNABLE TO ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY KNOB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73A6 (PANEL 06) - R2
ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE ANNUNCIATOR INTENSITY KNOB IS FAILED IN ONE POSITION, THE
CREW WILL BE UNABLE TO VARY THE INTENSITY OF THE ANNUNCIATOR
LIGHTS. THIS HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT ON THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-94
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1415 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A13A1 (PANEL RI3A1) - $2
ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN CIRCUIT IN THE STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY SWITCH CAUSES LOSS
OF ONE MEANS TO READ WHICH PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN OUT-OF-LIMITS, OR
TO CLEAR RECALL MEMORY. THE ANNUNCIATOR MEMORY SWITCH ALSO
PROVIDES THIS FUNCTION.
LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION HAS NO IMPACT TO THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNINGWORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-95
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1416 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)
INADVERTENT OPERATION - STUCK IN "READ"
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - $2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY SWITCH IS STUCK IN THE "READ"
POSITION, STATUS MATRIX LIGHTS FOR PARAMETERS WHICH HAVE BEEN OUT
OF LIMITS SINCE THE LAST MEMORY "CLEAR" WILL REMAIN ILLUMINATED.
A MASTER ALARM WILL BE ANNUNCIATED AS USUAL IN CASE OF AN OUT-OF-
LIMITS CONDITION. THE ANNUNCIATOR MEMORY SWITCH MAY ALSO BE USED
TO CLEAR THEMEMORY.
LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-96
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1417 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: C/W STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY (READ/ctr/CLEAR)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION - STUCK IN "CLEAR"
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - $2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE STATUS DISPLAY MEMORY SWITCH IS STUCK IN "CLEAR", OUT-OF-
LIMITS OCCURENCES WILL NOT BE STORED IN MEMORY. A MASTER ALARM
WILL BE ANNUNCIATED AS USUAL. THIS FUNCTION IS NON-ESSENTIAL,
AND ITS LOSS HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1418 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W STATUS DISPLAY LAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W STATUS DISPLAY LAMP TEST SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - $3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO TEST THE STATUS MATRIX LIGHTS HAS NO SAFETY
IMPACT.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. I, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-98
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1419 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W STATUS DISPLAY LAMP TEST (LEFT/ctr/RIGHT)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W STATUS DISPLAY LAMP TEST SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3A1) - $3
ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LAMP TEST SWITCH IS STUCK IN "LEFT" OR "RIGHT", HALF OF
THE STATUS MATRIX LIGHTS WILL REMAIN LIT, CAUSING LOSS OF ONE
MEANS OF CHECKING WHICH PARAMETERS HAVE BEEN OUT-OF-LIMITS OR ARE
CURRENTLY INHIBITED.
IF STUCK IN "LEFT", THE ABILITY TO DISPLAY PARAMETER LIMIT VALUES
ON THE C/W STATUS MATRIX IS ALSO LOST. THESE FUNCTIONS MAY BE
PERFORMED USING SM SPEC 60 OR GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
THIS FAILURE HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT ON THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-99
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1420 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W MODE (ACK/NORM/ASC)
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3 ) C/W MODE SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 35V73A3A5 (PANEL C3A5) - $7
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN CIRCUIT IN THE C/W MODE SWITCH WILL CUT OFF POWER TO THE
C/WANNUNCIATORARRAY AND THE F2 MA LIGHT. THE FUNCTIONS OF
THESE TWO ITEMS MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED USING CRT DISPLAYS AND THE
C/W STATUS DISPLAY MATRIX.
LOSS OF C/WANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN PROPER LIMITS; ALL C/W MONITORED
QUANTITIES ARE DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1421 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W MODE (ACK/NORM/ASC)
FAILS TO SWITCH - STUCK IN "ACK"
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) C/W MODE SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3A5 (PANEL C3A5) - S7
ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE C/W MODE SWITCH IS STUCK IN "ACKNOWLEDGE", POWER TO THE
C/W ANNUNCIATOR DISPLAY IS DISABLED, CAUSING LOSS OF ONE MEANS OF
FLAGGING AN OUT-OF-LIMITS CONDITION.
THE MASTER ALARM LIGHTS AND TONE AND CRT FAULT MESSAGES PROVIDE
REDUNDANT ANNUNCIATION, AND THE C/W STATUS DISPLAY ALLOWS THE
CREW TO CHECK WHICH PARAMETERS ARE OUT-OF-LIMITS.
LOSS OF C/WANNUNCIATIONHAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING PROPERLY; ALL C/W MONITORED QUANTITIES
ARE DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. I, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1422 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W PARAMETER SELECT
FAILS TO SWITCH / FAILS MID-TRAVEL
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W PARAMETER SELECT THUMBWNEELS / PUSHWHEELS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - $4
PART NUMBER: MC452-0134-? / ME452-0156-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE OR MORE PARAMETER SELECT THUMBWHEELS / PUSHWHEELS
CAUSES INABILITY TO SELECT PARAMETERS USING HARDWARE. THIS
FUNCTION MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED USING THE SM TABLE MAINTENANCE
DISPLAY (SPEC 60) OR GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
SINCE INITIAL LIMIT VALUES AND STATUS ARE PROGRAMMED INTO READ-
ONLY MEMORY, AND SINCE THESE PARAMETERS MAY BE MONITORED BY THE
CREW, LOSS OF ABILITY TO SELECT A PARAMETER HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i_ CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-I02
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1423 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: C/W LIMIT SET FUNCTION (SET/ctr/READ)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W LIMIT SET FUNCTION SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - $8
ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE CREW IS UNABLE TO SELECT "SET" OR "READ", THEY WILL BE
UNABLE TO SET OR READ PARAMETER LIMIT VALUES USING C/W SWITCHES.
THIS FUNCTION MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED USING SM SPEC 60 OR GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
IF LIMITS ARE INCORRECT FOR A FLIGHT PHASE, OUT-OF-LIMITS
CONDITIONS MAY GO UNANNUNCIATED.
HOWEVER, ALL C/W MONITORED PARAMETERS ARE DISPLAYED ON GAGES
AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS; LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY
IMPACT IF ALL INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING PROPERLY.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. 1, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-i03
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1424 ABORT:
ITEM: C/W LIMIT SET LIMIT (UPPER/LOWER)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT, FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)-
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W LIMIT SET LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3 '
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - $7
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO READ OR CHANGE PARAMETER LIMIT VALUES USING
C/W HARDWARE. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED BY THE SM
TABLE MAINTENANCE DISPLAY (SPEC 60).
IF LIMITS ARE INCORRECT FOR A FLIGHT PHASE, OUT-OF-LIMITS
CONDITIONS MAY GO UNANNUNCIATED.
HOWEVER, ALL C/W MONITORED PARAMETERS ARE DISPLAYED ON GAGES
AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS; LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY
IMPACT IF ALL INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING PROPERLY.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-I04
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1425 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W LIMIT SET VALUE
OPEN CIRCUIT, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W LIMIT SET VALUE THUMBWHEELS/PUSHWHEELS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - $6
MC452-0134-? / ME452-0156-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE OR MORE VALUE TWs PREVENTS THE CREW FROM SETTING
PARAMETER LIMITS USING C/W HARDWARE. PARAMETER LIMITS MAY ALSO
BE SET USING SM SPEC 60. IF THE LIMITS ARE INCORRECT FOR A
FLIGHT PHASE, AN OUT-OF-LIMITS CONDITION MAY GO UNANNUNCIATED.
ALL C/W MONITORED PARAMETERS ARE DISPLAYED ON GAGES AND/OR CRT
DISPLAYS; LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF
INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-i05
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1426 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W PARAMETER STATUS (TRIPPED/ctr/INHIBITED)
OPEN CIRCUIT, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W PARAMETER STATUS SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73A13AI (PANEL RI3A1) - Sl
ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PARAMETER STATUS SWITCH OUTPUT CAUSES LOSS OF THE ABILITY
TO CHECK RECALL MEMORY FOR OUT-OF-LIMITS OR INHIBITED PARAMETERS
USING THE C/W STATUS MATRIX. THE C/W ANNUNCIATOR ARRAY AND CRT
DISPLAYS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THIS FUNCTION.
LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-106
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1427 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W PARAMETER STATUS (TRIPPED/ctr/INHIBITED)
INADVERTENT OPERATION / FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W PARAMETER STATUS SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3" ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - S1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE PARAMETER STATUS SWITCH IS STUCK IN THE "TRIPPED" OR
"INHIBITED" POSITION, LIGHTS CORRESPONDING TO THOSE PARAMETERS
WILL BE ILLUMINATED, CAUSING LOSS OF ONE MEANS OF CHECKING THE
STATUS AND LIMIT VALUES OF PARAMETERS.
THESE FUNCTIONS MAY BE PERFORMED USING THE SM TABLE MAINTENANCE
DISPLAY.
FAILURE OF THE C/W PARAMETER STATUS SWITCH HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-i07
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
D&C FLIGHT:
1428 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W PARAMETER (ENABLE/ctr/INHIBIT)
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W PARAMETER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - $9
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ENABLE AN INHIBITED PARAMETER MAY RESULT IN
OUT-OF-LIMITS CONDITIONS GOING UNANNUNCIATED. REDUNDANCY FOR
THIS FUNCTION IS PROVIDED BY THE SM TABLE MAINTENANCE DISPLAY.
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING CORRECTLY; ALL C/W MONITORED PARAMETERS
ARE DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS, AND MAY BE MONITORED
BY THE CREW.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-I08
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1429 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W PARAMETER (ENABLE/ctr/INHIBIT)
INADVERTENT OPERATION / FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W PARAMETER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - $9
ME452-0102-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF STUCK IN "ENABLE", OR "INHIBIT", EACH PARAMETER SELECTED BY
THE PARAMETER SELECT THUMBWHEELS WILL BE ENABLED OR INHIBITED.
THIS CAN BE CORRECTED USING THE SM TABLE MAINTENANCE DISPLAY.
IF THE FAILURE IS NOT DISCOVERED, OUT-OF-LIMITS CONDITIONS COULD
GO UNANNUNCIATED.
LOSS OF C/WANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING CORRECTLY; ALL C/W MONITORED PARAMETERS
ARE DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS, AND MAY BE MONITORED
BY THE CREW.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-I09
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1430 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: C/W TONE VOLUME A (B)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W TONE VOLUME A (B)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - R1 (R2)
ME452-0093-? OR ME444-0059-? OR ME444-0060-II01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AM OPEN CIRCUIT IN ONE TONE VOLUME CONTROL IS A LOSS OF ONE OF
TWO AUDIO ANNUNCIATION MEANS.
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF ALL INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN THEIR SPECIFIED LIMITS; ALL C/W
MONITORED PARAMETERS ARE DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS,
AND MAY BE MONITORED BY THE CREW.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. I, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-II0
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1431 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W TONE VOLUME A (B)
FAILS MID-TRAVEL - STUCK IN ONE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W TONE VOLUME A (B)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI3AI (PANEL RI3AI) - R1 (R2)
PART NUMBER: ME452-0093-? OR ME444-0059-? OR ME444-0060-II01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF A TONE VOLUME CONTROL KNOB IS STUCK IN ONE POSITION, THE CREW
IS UNABLE TO VARY THE VOLUME OF THE KLAXON, SIREN, C/W AND SM
ALERT TONES.
THIS HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-111
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1432 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MASTER ALARM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO INDICATE
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) MASTER ALARM PBI
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 34V73A2 - SI, 34V73A4 - SI, 36V73A7AI - $51,
80V73AI24 - $3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0060-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE OF THE FOUR MASTER ALARM INDICATORS IS A LOSS OF
ONE MEANS OF ANNUNCIATING AN OUT-OF-LIMITS CONDITION. REDUNDANT
ANNUNCIATION IS PROVIDED BY THE 3 REMAINING MA INDICATORS, C/W
ANNUNCIATOR ARRAY LIGHTS AND ALARM TONES.
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF ALL INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN THEIR SPECIFIED LIMITS; ALL C/W
MONITORED QUANTITIES ARE DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. I, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-i12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1433 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MASTER ALARM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN / INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) MASTER ALARM PBI
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 34V73A2 - SI, 34V73A4 - SI, 36V73A7AI - $51,
80V73AI24 - $3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0060-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF A MASTER ALARM PBI IS FAILED CLOSED, A RESET DISCRETE IS SENT
TO THE ALARM SYSTEMS, RESETTING ALL AUDIO ALARMS.
THE C/W ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS WILL REMAIN LIT UNTIL THE OUT-OF-
LIMITS PARAMETERS ARE WITHIN LIMITS FOR THE SPECIFIED NUMBER OF
CYCLES.
THIS FAILURE MAY BE CORRECTED BY CYCLING THE C/W POWER; IT HAS
NO SAFETY IMPACT TO THE CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING CORRECTLY.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DWG. VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, 8/31/84; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, 8/5/83; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-113
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/29/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1434 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER ALARM
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEADANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) MASTER ALARM PBI
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 34V73A2 - SI, 34V73A4 - SI, 36V73A7AI - $51,
80V73AI24 - $3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0060-?
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF ONE MA PBI FAILS TO RESET AN ALARM TONE, ONE OF THE THREE
REMAINING MA PBIIS MAY BE USED. IF ALL FOUR ARE FAILED OPEN,
ALARMS MAY BE RESET BY CYCLING C/W SYSTEM A & B POWER, OR ALARMS
MAY BE DISABLED.
THIS FAILURE HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE
OPERATING WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES,
ALL VEHICLES, BASIC REV. B, 10/10/85.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-i14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
D&C/EPD&C
1435
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W A, C/W B
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W CIRCUIT BREAKERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73A13 (PANEL 013) - CBI, CB9
MC454-0026-2030 OR MC454-0032-3130
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE C/W A CIRCUIT BREAKER CAUSES LOSS OF THE PRIMARY
C&W SYSTEM; FAILURE OF THE C/W B CIRCUIT BREAKER CAUSES LOSS OF
ALL C/W LIGHTS AND TONES.
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN THEIR SPECIFIED LIMITS; ALL C/W
MONITORED QUANTITIES ARE ALSO DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT
DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129, SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL,
VOL. i, CAUTION & WARNING, AUGUST 31, 1984; C&W 2102, CAUTION &
WARNING WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983; JSC-12820, NASA - JSC FLIGHT
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-I15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/19/87
D&C/EPD&C
1436
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W A, C/W B, PWR CKT
FAILS TO OPEN THE CIRCUIT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
CAUTION & WARNING
C/W CIRCUIT BREAKERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 33V73AI3 (PANEL 013) - CBI, CB9
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030 OR MC454-0032-3130
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO BREAK THE CIRCUIT MAY RESULT IN DAMAGE TO THE C/W
SYSTEM, DISABLING IT.
LOSS OF C/W ANNUNCIATION HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF INTERFACING
SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN THEIR SPECIFIED LIMITS; ALL C/W
MONITORED QUANTITIES ARE ALSO DISPLAYED VIA GAGES AND/OR CRT
DISPLAYS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-I16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1437 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W LIMIT MODULE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) C/W LIMIT MODULE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V73A4AI (BAY 3A)
MC409-0012-0093? (-01037)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PARAMETER LIMIT VALUES HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF ALL
INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES,
ALL VEHICLES, BASIC REV. B, 10/10/85.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-I17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/24/87
D&C
1438
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C/W LIMIT MODULE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: /
ABORT: /
LEAD ANALYST: E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) CAUTION & WARNING
3) C/W LIMIT MODULE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V73A4AI (BAY 3A)
PART NUMBER: MC409-0012-0093? (-0103?)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PARAMETER LIMIT VALUES HAS NO SAFETY IMPACT IF ALL
INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN LIMITS.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL DRAWING VS70-730129 SCHEMATIC DRAWING -
CAUTION & WARNING SUBSYSTEM; C&W 2102, CAUTION & WARNING
WORKBOOK, AUGUST 5, 1983; JSC-18691, FDF MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES,
ALL VEHICLES, BASIC REV. B, 10/10/85.
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-118
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1601 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACA
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) ACA
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 014, 015, 016, 06, A6AI
PART NUMBER: MC434-0283-0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LAMPS WILL NOT BE ILLUMINATED. OTHER DIPLAYS, CRT, AND AUDIBLE
ALARM CAN PROVIDE INFORMATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO ABSENCE OF A REQUIRED CREW RESPONSE
DURING MANUAL MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-119
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/09/87
D&O/EPD&C
1602
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACA PWR CKT
FAILED OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) ACA
3) PWR CKT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 014, 015, 016, 06, A6AI
PART NUMBER: MC434-0283-0003
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LAMPS WILL NOT BE ILLUMINATE. OTHER DISPLAYS, CRT, AND AUDIBLE
ALARM CAN PROVIDE INFORMATION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO ABSENCE OF A REQUIRED CREW RESPONSE
DURING MANUAL MODE. CKD CONSIST OF CB, BUS SELECT, INTESITY
SW, RESISTORS, AND TEST SW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-120
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/09/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1603
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT
FAILURE MODE: FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) ACA
3) mm CKT
4)
s)
6)
7)
a)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014, 015, 016, 06, A6AI
MC434-0283-0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. CKT NORMALLY CLOSED. CKT CONSIST OF CB, BUS SELECT SW,
INTENSITY SW, RESISTORS, AND TEST SW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7109/87
SUBSYSTEM: D&C/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1604
ITEM: ACA PWR CKT-EVENT
FAILURE MODE: FAILED OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2) ACA
3) _ CKT
4) EVENTS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 014, 015, 016, 06, A6AI
PART NUMBER: MC434-0075-0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LAMPS WILL NOT BE ILLUMINATE.
ALARM CAN PROVIDE INFORMATION.
SW, RESISTORS, AND TEST SW.
OTHER DISPLAYS, CRT, AND AUDIBLE
CKT CONSIST OF CB, BUS SELECT,
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-122
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87
D&C/EPD&C
1701
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER-PQI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) OMS/RCS QUANTITY GUAGE
3 ) CIRCUIT BREAKER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL 03
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FOR OMS/RCS QUANTITY GAUGE - NOT CRITICAL FOR
FLIGHT - ONLY ACCUIRATE SOURCE OF PROPELLANT QUANTITY IS GROUND
CALCULATIONS. NOTE: THE OMS WORKSHEETS 187, 188, 189, 606, AND
613 COVER ALL OTHER QUANTITY GUAGE FAILURE MODES.
REFERENCES: (I) 73P880001, (2) JSC 12770, (3) JSC 1174,11.2, (4)
JSC 19950, (5) JSC 18958
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1702 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH; (POLES STUCK IN ONE OF THREE
POSITION OR POLES FAIL TO MAKE CONTACT IN ANY POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) D&C
2) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
3) INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL 03 SII
PART NUMBER: 33V73A3-SII
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO SELECT OMS/RCS/KIT PROPELLANT QUANTITY FOR
VISUAL DISPLAY ON METER MI2. THERE ARE TWO OTHER REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT PATHS FOR THE OMS AND ONE REDUNDANT PATH FOR RCS. IN
THE OMS, ONE PATH IS THROUGH THE GPC THE OTHER HARDWIRED TO THE
GSE PNL (J207). LOSS OF ALL QUANTITY PATHS HAVE NO EFFECT SINCE
GROUND CALCULATIONS WOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-124
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1703 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 03 MI2
33V73A3-MI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO SELECT OMS/RCS/KIT PROPELLANT QUANTITY FOR
VISUAL DISPLAY ON METER MI2. THERE ARE TWO OTHER REDUNDANT
MEASUREMENT PATHS FOR THE OMS AND ONE REDUNDANT PATH FOR RCS. IN
THE OMS, ONE PATH IS THROUGH THE GPC THE OTHER HARDWIRED TO THE
GSE PNL (J207). LOSS OF ALL QUANTITY PATHS HAVE NO EFFECT SINCE
GROUND CALCULATIONS WOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV A EO BI2
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-125
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1704 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOTALIZER
ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
TOTALIZER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: IMPROPER INPUT, CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC OPERATION IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF LOW QUANTITY WARNING
COULD ALLOW HELIUM INGESTION AND PROP DEPLETION, HOWEVER PROP
MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING IS SUCH THAT UNEXPECTED/UNDESIRED
DEPLETION OF PROP IS UNCREDIBLE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD ALLOW
FAILURE OF
COMMUNICATION SCREEN AND PASSAGE OF HELIUM INTO AFT COMPARTMENT
TO GO UNDETECTED (REQUIRES MULTIPLE FAILURES).
REFERENCES: i) 73P880001 2) JSC 12770
JSC 19950 5) JSC 18958
3) JSC 11174, 11.2 4)
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-126
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1705 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOTALIZER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
TOTALIZER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
CAUSES: IMPROPER INPUT, CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS INDICATIONS OF PROP QUANTITY OR LOW LEVEL QUANTITY ARE
NO EFFECT. PROP MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING IS SUCH THAT ACTUAL PROP
QUANTITY IS KNOWN. ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF COMMUNICATION SCREEN
FAILURE AND PASSAGE OF HELIUM WOULD RESULT IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF ULLAGE BURNS PRIOR TO OMS BURNS AND POSSIBLE LOSS
OF INTERCONNECT CAPABILITY FROM AFFECTED TANK.
REFERENCES: 1) 73P880001 2) JSC 12770 3) JSC 11174, 11.2 4)
JSC 19950 5) JSC 18958
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1706 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOTALIZER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
D&C
HARDWARE COMPONENTS
ASSEMBLIES
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
PROPELLANT GAGING ASSEMBLY
TOTALIZER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 73P880001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT POWER, CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING
DEFECT, MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OUTPUT IS NO EFFECT. LOSS OF LOW QUANTITY WARNING COULD
ALLOW HELIUM INGESTION AND PROP DEPLETION, HOWEVER PROP
MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING IS SUCH THAT UNEXPECTED/UNDESIRE
DEPLETION OF PROP IS UNCREDIBLE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD ALLOW
FAILURE OF
COMMUNICATION SCREEN AND PASSAGE OF HELIUM INTO AFT COMPARTMENT
TO GO UNDETECTED (REQUIRES MULTIPLE FAILURES).
REFERENCES: 1) 73P880001 2) JSC 12770
JSC 19950 5) JSC 18958
3) JSC 11174, 11.2 4)
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-128
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1801 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ILLUMINATION-FLD LTS
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2 ) ILLUMINATION
3 ) FLOOD LIGHTS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AVIONIC BAY
PART NUMBER: MC434-0068-0014
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF FLOOD LIGHTS NOT CRITICAL, INTERNAL LIGHTING
PROVIDES ADEQUATE ILLUMINATION. CRIT 3/2R FOR PAYLOAD BAY AND
DOCKING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1802 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ILLUMINATION-POT
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) D&C
2) ILLUMINATION
3) POTENTIOMETERS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PNL 06,08, AFT
PART NUMBER: MC444-0059-I002-I012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DIM OR INCREASE ILLUMINATION.
CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
NOT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-130
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1803 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ILLUMINATION CONTROL CKT
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) ILLUMINATION
3) CONTROL CKT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AVIONIC BAY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, CREW CAN USE OTHER AVAILABLE LIGHTING. CIRCUIT CONTAINS
CB, VAR POT, SW, FUSES AND STEP-DN TRANSFORMER
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: D&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1804 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ILLUMINATION-SPOTLIGHTS
FAIL OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) ILLUMINATION
3) SPOTLIGHTS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSLG
MC434-0062-0011,-0035
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ILLUMINATION MAY EFFECT THE MISSION OPERATION DUE TO POOR
VISIBILITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-132
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/27/87
D&C/EPD&C
1810
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ILLUMINATION PWR CKT
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) D&C
2) ILLUMINATION
3) POWER CIRCUIT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONIC BAY
CAUSES: SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. LOSS OF ILLUMINATION NOT CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY
OR MISSION COMPLETION. PWER CIRCUIT CONSIST OF CB, RESISTORS, SW,
AND RPC.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
D&C/EPD&C
1811
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
ILLUMINATION-PWR CKT
FAIL CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) D&C
2 ) ILLUMINATION
3) PWR CKT
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AVIONIC BAY
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. UNABLE TO VARY THE INTENSITY OF THE ILLUMINATION, OR TURN
OFF THE ILLUMINATION. PWR CKT CONSIST OF CB'S, SW, RPC'S,
RESISTORS, AND FUSES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/87 C-134
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC ITEM
i01
102
103
104
106
107
ii0
1804
HUDE
HUDE
PDU
PDU
HUD-RESISTOR CUR LM
HUD SW ON/OFF
HUD - RPC
ILLUM SPOTLT
FAILURE MODE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
D-I
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